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Abstract 
The continued rise in oil prices since 2002 has resulted in a significant increase in export 
revenue for oil exporting countries. This increase in the price of oil and other commodities 
means that OPEC countries and Russia have received, between 2003 and 2006, a windfall 
of 1.3 trillion dollars with respect to their export level in 2002. This paper analyzes, using the 
limited data available, the recycling of these resources back to the world economy through 
the trade channel, via higher imports, or the financial channel, via an increase in the net 
external asset position of these countries. Our results show that around 50% of the windfall 
revenue has been used to increase imports, while the rest has been directed towards 
international reserve accumulation and other improvements in the net asset position of 
these countries. Comparing the current oil price increase with previous ones, such as those 
resulting from the tightening of oil supply in the 70’s, we find that the trade channel has been 
more important in the current episode than in previous ones. This can be attributed to (i) the 
perception of a more permanent increase in the price of oil in the context of rising demand, 
and (ii) the gradualism of the current oil price increase, which has allowed a stronger 
response from imports. 
 
JEL Codes: Q43, F14. 
Keywords: Oil, exports, imports, internacional reserves, net internacional assets, 
commercial recycling, financial recycling. 
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1 Introduction 
The steady and significant increase in the price of oil since early 2002 has brought 
it to historical highs in nominal terms in the third quarter of 2005 and once again in 
January 2006 when Brent crude oil reached a price of 68 USD per barrel, more than tripling 
its January 2002 price (chart 1).1 Although, in real terms, oil has not yet reached its 
historical maximum of 1980, the current increase has translated into a significant 
improvement in the terms of trade of oil exporting countries. As a whole, oil exporting 
countries received around 700USD billion in 2005 for their exports (a 73% increase 
from 2001) of which around 80% corresponded to OPEC countries and Russia. In this note, 
we analyze, using the limited amount of data available for these economies, the recycling 
of these resources via trade and financial channels and compare it to previous oil prices 
increases. 
                                                                            
1. For a more detailed analysis of the causes and consequences of the oil price increase see, for instance, Ruiz (2004). 
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2 Recent evolution of export revenue in the main oil exporting countries 
The increase in the price of oil since 2002 represented a significant increase in export revenue 
for oil exporting countries. As chart 1 shows, the real value of total exports by OPEC 
countries and Russia has not yet surpassed its 1979 level even though forecasts by different 
international institutions and futures’ markets suggest that the current increase in oil prices 
might be more permanent than in previous episodes. 
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The price of natural gas has traditionally been highly correlated with the price of oil 
because of the indexing of its contracts to the price of oil. However, and in contrast with the 
usually low correlation between the price of oil and that of other raw materials, the increase in 
the price of oil during this episode has been accompanied by an increase in the price of other 
raw materials, especially industrial metals. This unusual behaviour reflects the importance of 
strong global demand for raw materials as one of the leading explanatory factors behind the 
oil price increase. This simultaneous increase in the price of oil and other raw materials 
justifies the inclusion of exports of other goods in the present analysis given its importance, 
especially for Russia.2 
A possible measure of the export revenue windfall is the difference between the 
value of a country’s exports and its value in a given base year. Since chart 1 shows 2003 to 
be the year where export revenue started to increase for OPEC countries and Russia, 
the rest of this note takes 2002 as the base year in the analysis of the current oil 
price increase. As shown in chart 2, the total value of exports by OPEC countries and Russia 
in 2003 was 87 USD billion higher than in 2002, a difference that kept increasing in 2004 
and 2005. Estimations by the Energy Information Administration put the value of oil exports 
in these countries in 2005 at around 335 USD billion above its 2002 level, to which an 
                                                                            
2. Exports of raw materials account for 85% of the total value of Russia’s exports despite oil exports accounting for 
just 40%. This contrasts with OPEC countries where the share of oil exports in total exports is, for instance, 98% in 
Nigeria, 95% in Saudi Arabia, 90% in Iran or 82% in Venezuela. 
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additional 100 USD billion could be added due to the increase in the value of non-oil exports. 
This means that the total windfall between 2002 and 2005 was near 785 USD billion, 
a magnitude that would increase to close to 1.35 USD trillion according to forecasts for 2006. 
 
 
The relative size of this windfall can be very significant or not depending on which 
magnitude we compare it to. For instance, the cumulative export windfall between 2002 
and 2005 was equivalent to approximately to 1.2% of world GDP or 42% of the increase in 
global international reserves held in the same period. Nevertheless, comparisons with the 
value of the world equity or bond market reflect the big size of financial markets relative to real 
indicators such as exports from OPEC countries and Russia. For instance, the value of the 
windfall in these countries between 2002 and 2004 was only equivalent to 1.7% of the 
increase in worldwide stock market capitalization, to 4% of the increase in global public debt, 
or 3.2% of the increase in global private debt in the same period. 
On top of the previous comparisons, referred to the size of resources transferred 
towards main oil exporters, it is important to highlight the negative contribution of oil to 
the current account balance of oil importers, such as most European countries, Japan 
and the United States. For instance, the contribution of net oil imports to the US trade 
deficit increased from 22% in 2002 to 31% in 2005, thus worsening of global imbalances 
in 2004 and 2005. This has also been reflected into an increased contribution of OPEC 
countries and Russia to the US current account deficit. Thus, United States’ trade deficit 
with these countries accounted for 14% of its total trade deficit in 2005,3 —up from 10% 
in 2003—, a percentage which is bigger than that for the Euro zone or Japan, though still 
below the 27% attributable to China. 
                                                                          
3. The other two countries that also supply a substantial part of US oil imports are Canada and Mexico who do not 
belong to OPEC. Nevertheless, OPEC supplies around 50% of total US oil imports, while oil exports from Russia to 
the US represent a very small fraction of total US oil imports. 
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The relative size of the export windfall described above justifies the study of its 
recycling towards world markets. There are two channels through which this recycling might 
take place: (i) the trade channel, by increasing their imports from the rest of the world, and 
(ii) the financial channel, by improving these countries’ net asset position. During the oil price 
increase of 1973 —and, to a lesser extent, in 1979— additional oil export revenue was mostly 
recycled via the financial sector, contributing to the development of the so-called Euromarkets 
and to the expansion of credit to emerging countries, eventually leading to the debt crisis of 
the early 1980’s.  
There are several important similarities and differences between the recent increase 
in the export revenue of OPEC countries and those of 1973, 1979, or 2000. Chart 2 shows 
that, for the current three-year period, the real increase in export revenue relative to the 
base year is similar to the two shocks of the seventies. Nevertheless, there are two important 
differences, which might influence how this additional revenue is finally recycled: 
the persistence of this additional revenue and the gradualism of the increase in export 
revenue. 
-800
-700
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
2002 2003 2004 2005
Oil deficit Other goods and services deficit
CONTRIBUTION BY TYPE OF GOOD AND SERVICE
billion USD
UNITED STATES CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE CHART 3
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
a. Except Venezuela, included in OPEC.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
CANADA LATIN
AMERICA
(a)
EURO
ZONE
REST OF
EUROPE
JAPAN CHINA REST ASIA-
PACIFIC
OPEC and
RUSSIA
OTHER
2003 2004 2005
CONTRIBUTION BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
Percentage of trade account deficit
%
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0605 
With respect to the first point, the present surge in the price of oil might be perceived 
as more permanent than previous increases (especially those in 1979 and, particularly, 
in 2000) as suggested by the recent evolution futures’ prices, stable around $60 per barrel 
until 2012. If the increase in export revenue —and, therefore, national income and, 
oftentimes, fiscal revenue— is perceived as permanent, its effect on consumption and 
imports should be higher compared to those cases where the increase was perceived as 
temporary. Judging by chart 1, one could think that the price increase in 1973 was more 
permanent than that in 1979. On the other hand, chart 4 shows how in 2000, futures markets 
reflected an oil price increase which was expected to be transitory, with the oil price reverting 
to a band between $18 and $22 per barrel. Contrary to that, in 2005 futures contracts 
reflected market expectations consistent with a permanent increase in prices. Thus, in theory, 
one could expect a higher propensity to consume and import during the current episode and 
that of 1973 than during those of 1979 and 2000. 
 
The second feature of the current increase in oil export revenue in OPEC countries 
has been its gradualism, when compared to the episodes of 1973 and 1979 (see chart 2). 
This reflects a sustained increase in the demand for crude oil and an accommodating supply 
by OPEC, as opposed to the price increases in 1973 and 1979, which occurred in a context 
of sharp supply restrictions. The more gradual increase in oil export revenue over the last two 
years could allow, in principle, a larger recycling through imports than in previous episodes.4 
 
                                                                            
4. There is anecdotal evidence that, for instance, the increase of imports in the 1970’s might have been slowed down 
due to the lack of the necessary infrastructure to absorb the surge in demand for imports of goods in OPEC countries. 
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3 Recycling channels of oil export revenue 
For a useful decomposition of how could additional revenue be recycled, it is useful to 
remember the accounting identity for the balance of payments, which, in a simplified way, can 
be expressed as follows: 
X M CAP Res− + = ∆   (1) 
where X and M represent, respectively, the value of goods exports and imports, CAP 
represent net capital inflows (excluding changes in the holdings of international reserves) 
and ∆Res is the variation in international reserves’ holdings.5 In order to analyze the recycling 
of export revenue, we need to consider to which extent is the export revenue used to 
increase imports of goods and services and to which extent it is channeled towards an 
improvement in the country’s net external asset position. Dividing through the previous 
equation by total exports, we obtain a measure of the average recycling of export revenue: 
 
      1                       
average average
average
 commercial          financial
recycling
recycling recycling
M Res CAP
X X
∆ −= +
= +
  (2) 
 
The next two sections analyze the evolution of the average recycling via the 
commercial and the financial channel according to the decomposition shown above. 
3.1 Commercial channel 
Even though, the value of total exports by OPEC countries has not yet surpassed, in real 
terms, its maximum levels achieved in 1980 (chart 5), imports by these countries have grown 
above its trend of the last years which has led them to levels slightly above those reached in 
the early 1980’s. 
As described in the previous section, a possible measure of the average recycling of 
export revenues (which is different from the recycling of additional revenue, analyzed later 
in the note) via imports is the ratio between imports and exports. Chart 5 displays the value of 
this ratio for OPEC countries with data for Russia available only after 1992, the first year 
for which data is available for this country. These data suggest that the average recycling via 
imports in OPEC countries is, presently, around 60%, that is slightly above the level achieved 
during the two big oil price increase episodes of the 1970’s. The value ratio tends to fall 
during oil price increase episodes due to the sudden increase in the value of exports that only 
slowly translates into an increase in imports. The evolution of the import to export ratio can be 
                                                                            
5. It is important to point out that CAP is an aggregate that includes the balance of services, the balance of earned 
income, as well as current capital transfer together with the balance from the financial account (excluding the change in 
foreign reserves). Strictly speaking we should only consider the financial account balance when studying the recycling of 
exports via the financial channel but it is also true that this one represents the main component of the CAP aggregate. 
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attributed to the existence of a minimum import requirement by these countries (independent 
of the value of exports) which could also explain the existence of a certain degree of inertia 
in the volume of imports, attributable partly to demographic growth in OPEC countries. This 
factor coupled with the volatility in the volume and value of exports has meant a lower volatility 
for imports relative to that of exports. 
 
 
The recycling of the windfall via imports favours mostly Asia and Europe, who have a 
share in imports by OPEC countries and Russia larger than that suggested by their share 
of World GDP (chart 6). It is particularly worth noting the rising penetration ratio of China and 
the rest of emerging Asia in the last 15 years into these markets, which has come at the 
expense of the United States, Japan and Europe. It is important, however, to keep in mind 
that the importance of OPEC countries and Russia in the global export markets remains not 
very large —accounting for between 3 and 6 percent of total exports for each of the regions 
in chart 6— so that the overall effect on external demand of these regions is likely to be 
relatively small. Thus, in 2004, the increase in exports to OPEC countries and Russia 
contributed in 0.1 percentage points to US export growth, in 0.5 to the Euro zone’s export 
growth, in 0.3 to Japan’s, and in 0.7 for China’s export growth. 
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ORIGIN OF IMPORTS BY OPEC COUNTRIES AND RUSSIA (a) CHART 6
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3.2 Financial channel 
Other than being used to increase imports, the oil export revenue could be devoted to 
improving the net international asset position of oil exporting countries. Thus, the financial 
channel includes increases in the amount of foreign reserves held and net capital outflows 
which would be reflected in an improvement in the net asset position of these countries. 
The huge increase in the nominal value of exports and imports means that the value 
of export revenue used to improve the international net asset position of these countries has 
reached historical maxima in nominal terms in 2004 and, again, in 2005 (see chart 7). 
Nevertheless, these resources, those not used towards increasing imports, have been, in real 
terms, below their historical maxima of 1979-1981 and similar to those of 1973-1975. 
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Data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) show a significant increase in 
the net asset positions of oil exporting countries vis-à-vis BIS reporting banks. This is a result 
of the highly positive correlation between the price of oil and the net asset positions of these 
countries. Chart 8 shows that the net asset positions of oil exporting countries are at their 
historical maximum even though, in real terms, current positions are very similar to those 
reached in 1980. It is important to point out that despite the big increase of deposits held by 
oil exporting countries, these only amounted to about 3% of total deposits in BIS reporting 
banks as of January 2005. This is in contrast with the maximum value of 13% for this ratio 
that was achieved during the price increase episode that began in 1979. 
 
 
The reduction in the relative importance of oil exporting countries in total bank 
deposits is the result of the combination of two main factors: (i) the diversification of assets 
by oil exporting countries towards other (non-banking) assets, and (ii) the increasing 
importance of deposits by other emerging economies, especially those in Asia since the 1997 
crisis.6  
The currency composition of deposits of OPEC countries and Russia displays a big 
change between 2002 and the first months of 2005. It is especially revealing the reduction in 
the euro share in these countries’ deposits relative to the dollar since early 2004, which does 
not seem to be related to the evolution of the price of oil. A recent survey by the BIS (2005) 
cites the relative stabilization of the dollar/euro exchange rate and the increase in the 
short-term interest differential in favour of the dollar as the potential explanatory factors 
for this shift. Along these lines, this study also finds that, from 2004 onwards, there has been 
an increase in the sensibility of the currency shares in bank deposits of oil exports to the 
interest rate differential. 
                                                                          
6. The net asset position of countries in emerging Asia reverted from net liabilities of around 220 USD billion in 1997 to 
net assets of 97 USD billion in 2001, a level which has subsequently declined to 35 USD billion in the third quarter of 
2005. 
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The geographical distribution of OPEC countries and Russia’s net assets reveals 
the traditional and still big importance of the United Kingdom as a financial centre for these 
countries (chart 8). However, it is worth noting the substantial improvements in the net asset 
position of these countries vis-à-vis the Euro zone, which has gone from net liabilities of $54 
billion in 1998 to over USD 30 billion of net assets in 2005. It is also worth pointing out the big 
increase in the net asset position of these countries vis-à-vis the United States with the 
position improving from net assets of around $16 billion in 1998 to close to $43 billion 
in 2005. 
While it is true that international reserves held by OPEC countries and Russia have 
more than doubled between 2001 and the third quarter of 2005, it is important to point out 
that, in real terms, international reserves held by OPEC countries are still slightly below the 
level they reached in the mid-1970’s (chart 9). The process of reserve accumulation has been 
particularly spectacular in Russia where reserve accumulation, measured as a share of total 
exports, has proceeded at a similar rate as that of OPEC countries during the 1973 episode. 
Nevertheless, the recent increase in the holdings of international reserves by oil 
exporting countries has taken place in a context of global accumulation of reserves, which 
have gone from $2.3 trillion in 2003 to over $4.1 trillion in the third quarter of 2005 with a 
significant portion of this increase attributable to countries in emerging Asia. This implies that, 
despite the big increase in international reserves held by oil exporting countries, their share 
of the total amount of reserves has only gone up to 9% in 2005 from 7% in 2000, a much 
lower figure than those seen during the 1970’s when they account for almost 30% of 
total international reserves. In terms of reserve accumulation, OPEC countries and Russia 
accounted for 14% of the total increase in reserves during the 2002-2004 period which is 
large but still dwarfed by the 67% share of the total increase in the period 1973-1976. 
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Simultaneously with the increase in foreign reserves, some oil exporting countries 
have channeled a portion of the oil export windfall towards the re-purchase of their own 
outstanding foreign debt. For instance, Russia has reduced its stock of external debt 
from 58% of GDP in 2000 to around 36% in 2004 with an even more impressive reduction 
in public debt, which moved from about 44% of GDP in 2000 to only 18% in 2004. In the 
United Arab Emirates, public debt as a share of GDP went from 26% in 2000 to 15% in 2004. 
In Saudi Arabia, the central government has used a significant portion of the additional oil 
export revenue to reduce its indebtness, which has gone from 86% of GDP in 2000 to 63% 
in 2004 with an additional reduction expected in 2005 to 46%. 
While most of the countries analyzed have formally established stabilization funds 
to channel an important part of the additional oil export revenue, the discipline with which 
each country has followed its own usage rules for these funds has varied widely. Thus, many 
of them have been used in a discretionary way to finance public spending or reinvestments 
in the energy sector (Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Algeria) or to pay for domestic 
subsidy programs to refined oil products (Venezuela, Iran, Algeria, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia). 
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4 Recycling of additional revenue and comparison with previous episodes 
The analysis in the previous section, while useful to gives us a sense of how oil exporters use 
their export revenue, does not give us the full picture on how the additional revenue 
generated by an oil price increase is being recycled. To this effect, we return to our initial 
balance of payments identity X–M+CAP=∆Res and analyze the variation in each component 
with respect to a given base year: 
 
d d d1                                       
d d d
recycling of recycling via the recycling via the
     +      
additional revenue commercial channel financial channel
M CAP Res
X X X
∆⎛ ⎞= + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
 (3) 
 
where dY represents the variation in variable Y with respect to the base year of choice. 
Equation (3) shows that additional revenue from exports (dX) can be channeled into 
additional imports (dM), an acceleration in the accumulation of international reserves (d ∆Res) 
or a reduction in net capital inflows (dCAP) either via an increase in international assets, a 
decrease in international liabilities or a combination of both. 
Chart 10 shows the decomposition of additional revenue in OPEC countries and 
Russia according to their usage. Given the meager quality of the financial data available, 
we consider a decomposition into only three possible uses: (i) increases in imports, 
(ii) acceleration in international reserve accumulation, and (iii) a category we label “Other” 
which includes the balance of the rest of the financial account in the balance of payments, the 
balance of services account as well as the balance on transfers and income. Aggregating 
the windfall for OPEC countries and Russia, the cumulative increase in imports between 2003 
and 2005 with respect to 2002 accounted for about 51% of the additional export revenue 
while the increase in the accumulation of international reserves accounted for around 28% of 
the export windfall. The remaining 19% of the windfall has been recycled via the net outflow 
of resources from these countries, mainly through the financial account.7 
 
 
 
                                                                            
7. Presently there are no data on the decomposition of the different concepts of the balance of payments for all OPEC 
member countries until year 2004. However, using available data for Russia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Venezuela 
(which represent around 60% of the additional export revenue of those considered in chart 10) we can estimate the 
contribution of each component in the balance of payments to the “Other” category. The 28% that is assigned 
to this category in the accumulated 2003-2004 column could be decomposed in around 7 percentage points 
of other components of the current account (especially to the balance of services) and 21 percentage points to 
the financial account of the balance of payments. Using this more sophisticated decomposition, we can say that 
around 60% of the additional export revenue has been recycled through the commercial channel (in a broad sense) while 
the remaining 40% via the financial channel. 
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Our estimates for the recycling of additional export revenue via the commercial 
channel are broadly in line with recent estimations by the IMF (2005 and 2006) for countries in 
the Middle East and central Asia. The IMF (2005) study estimates that around 50% of the 
additional oil export revenue between 2002 and 2005 has been used to finance an increase 
imports in these countries, although IMF (2006) reduced that estimate to around 36%.8 Our 
estimates are, however, slightly below those obtained by the OECD (2005) using time series 
data between 1997 and 2004. 
                                                                            
8. The estimates put forth by the FMI in the World Economic Outlook in April 2006 assume, unlike we do in our analysis, 
that (i) the increase in non-oil export revenue does not represent a positive income shock these countries, and (ii) that the 
marginal propensity to import out of the rest of items in the current account is equal to 100%. Both assumptions 
combine to generate a lower estimate of the importance of the commercial channel in the recycling of the export 
revenue windfall than the one we present for the 2002-2005 episode, even though It is worthwhile pointing out that 
these assumptions were not as important for other oil-price increase episodes when the increase in non-oil export 
revenue was not as significant. 
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In particular, the OECD estimates suggest that around 60% of the additional export 
revenue in OPEC countries would translate into higher imports within the next two years. It is 
important to keep in mind that the estimations performed in this article include only the 
contemporaneous effect accumulated over the first years following the oil price increase. 
This means that the lagged effects on imports of the big increase in export revenue in 2004 
and 2005 might not have been fully realized yet. 
 
RECYCLING OF EXPORTS WINDFALL IN OPEC COUNTRIES CHART 11
Sources: BEA, IMF, and BIS.
a. Percentage of exports windfall relative to the intial year in each period.
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In order to compare the importance of the different recycling channels to that in 
previous episodes, chart 11 shows the use given by OPEC countries to the export windfall 
in the years following the oil price increase episodes of 1973, 1979, 1998, and 2002. 
For the sake of temporal consistency, data for Russia are excluded from the graph above 
since they are only available for the 1998-2001 and the 2002-2005 episodes. In each episode 
considered, the export windfall is defined as the additional export revenue with respect to the 
first year in the period, considered the base year. As it is evident from chart 11, recycling via 
imports has been higher in the 2002-2005 episode than in any of the three previous ones, 
probably as a consequence of (i) the perception of higher degree of permanency in the oil 
price increase, (ii) the more gradual pattern of the increase, and (iii) the improvement in the 
trade infrastructure which has allowed imports to grow as a result of the increase in income. 
This higher recycling via imports is consistent with the article by Barrel and Pomerantz (2004) 
who find that the response of imports to an increase in export revenue would have 
accelerated since the mid 1980’s. 
On the other hand, international reserve accumulation has also been an important 
recycling channel —it amounts to around 15% of the windfall— even though its importance 
was smaller than in the previous episodes of the 1970’s (17% in 1973-1976 and 24% 
in 1978-1981). However, if we include data for Russia in the current episode, this ratio 
becomes 22% making this channel more important in the current episode than in 
the 1973-1976 and 1998-2001 episodes and only slightly below the 1978-1981 episode. 
Finally, even though the fraction of the windfall recycled via capital flows is not very 
different from that of the 1970’s, it is important to keep two factors in mind: (i) including 
Russia, this percentage falls to 28%, and (ii) unlike in the 1970’s a bigger share of the 
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additional export revenue has been used to reduce external debt in oil exporting 
countries instead of being used to improve the net asset position of oil exporting countries in 
the international banking system.9 
                                                                            
9. In a similar fashion to the exercise performed in footnote 7, we could estimate the contribution to the financial account 
balance and the rest of concepts of the balance of payments of the “Other” component in chart 11 using available data 
on balance of payments for a few OPEC countries in each of the episodes considered in this graph. The contribution of 
the financial account to the “Other” category would go up progressively over time going from 65% for the 1973-1976 
episode to 98% in the 2002-2004 episode. This means that recycling through the commercial channel (in a broad sense) 
for the periods 1973-1976, 1978-1981, 1998-2001 and 2002-2005 would be, respectively, around 52%, 38%, 36%, 
and 52% of the additional revenue meaning that the rest would have been recycled via the financial channel 
(reserve accumulation and a negative balance on the financial account). The evolution of the recycling via the commercial 
would, therefore, present a similar profile as the one depicted in chart 11 even though the percentages for 1973-1976 
and 2002-2005 would be more similar. 
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5 Conclusions 
The increase in export revenue in OPEC countries and Russia has meant an inflow of 
resources for these countries larger than that of any previous oil price increase episode 
even though, in real terms, this revenue only reached in 2005, a level similar to that in 1980. 
Taking as a reference the export revenue these countries received in 2002, we estimate that 
the OPEC countries and Russia experienced a total export windfall of around $785 billion 
between 2003 and 2005. 
In the last three years, 51% of the total windfall in OPEC countries and Russia was 
devoted to financing increases in imports by these countries. The rest of additional resources 
were recycled via the financial channel, either through international reserve accumulation 
(22%) or via the improvement in the net position of other assets (28%). This increase in net 
external assets has included a significant reduction in the stock of foreign debt of some of the 
main oil exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia and Russia. It is important, however, to 
take into the possible existence of lagged effects between the increase in export revenue 
and the increase in imports meaning that the estimate for the recycling via the commercial 
channel presented in this article might, in the medium run, be larger and more in line with 
the OECD (2005) estimates. 
The current breakdown of the export windfall among the different recycling channels 
contrasts sharply with that of the 1973 and 1979 oil price increase episodes, when the 
commercial channel absorbed, on average, only 28% of the total windfall. This difference can 
most likely be attributed to the perception of higher degree of permanency of the oil price 
increase and the more gradual revenue increase in the current episode relative to 
previous episodes. This increase in export windfall recycling via the commercial channel has 
been especially beneficial for Europe and emerging Asia, the areas with the most weight in 
the geographical distribution of imports by OPEC countries and Russia. 
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